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Note
Assessing the Application of McDonnell Douglas to
Employment Discrimination Claims Brought
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act
Lianne C. Knych
Discrimination against persons with disabilities1 permeates
American society.2 This is especially true in the context of em-
ployment. Employers often reject highly qualified job appli-
cants,3 deny promotions and other employment opportunities to
1. Recent commentary on the rights of disabled persons has distinguished
between the words "handicap" and "disability." "Some commentators... assert
that disability refers to a medical condition and that handicap refers to one's
status as a result of a disability." UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CiviL RIGHTS,
ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM oiF INDIDuAL ABILITIEs 5 (1983) [hereinafter
SPECTRUM]. Other commentators prefer the phrase "person with a disability,"
because it focuses on the individual more than the disability. See Jonathan C.
Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the
Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy For People With Disabilities,
40 UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1342 n.2 (1993). This Note will primarily use the
phrase "persons with disabilities" because it emphasizes the person rather than
the disability.
2. Congress, in passing the Americans with Disabilities Act, found:
[Historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals
with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a seri-
ous and pervasive social problem;... individuals with disabilities are a
discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions
and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our soci-
ety, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indic-
ative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and
contribute to society.
42 U.S.C. § 12007(a)(1), (7) (Supp. V 1993).
3. See, e.g., School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 n.9 (1987) (citing re-
marks of Sen. Walter Mondale regarding a woman crippled by arthritis who
was denied a job as a teacher because college trustees thought students should
not see her); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 298-99 (5th
Cir. 1981) (discussing the Postal Service's refusal to hire an individual because
a war injury prevented him from lifting his arms above his head); Rosalie K.
Murphy, Note, Reasonable Accommodation and Employment Discrimination
Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1607,
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existing employees, 4 and terminate employees, 5 because of their
disabilities. In response to the substantial discrimination
against persons with disabilities and the failure of existing fed-
eral legislation to address such discrimination, 6 Congress
passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 7
The ADA, for the first time, comprehensively prevents private,
as well as public, employers from discriminating based on
disability.8
The ADA differs significantly from federal legislation pro-
scribing other forms of employment discrimination, such as Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 The ADA defines discrimi-
nation differently than Title VII,1° and places on employers an
additional duty to reasonably accommodate the needs of workers
with disabilities. 1 Despite these differences, some courts inter-
preting the ADA have applied the test the United States
Supreme Court developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
1612 (1991) (describing the situation of a disabled graduate of Harvard Law
School who was rejected more than 600 times before being hired as a corporate
counsel).
4. Meisser v. Howe, 872 F. Supp. 507, 520-22 (N.D. I1I. 1994) (finding em-
ployer's failure to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's blindness denied him the
opportunity to compete effectively for promotions).
5. Arline, 480 U.S. at 275-76 (holding that school board's dismissal of a
teacher on the basis that she had tuberculosis, which was in remission, was
unlawful disability discrimination).
6. The National Council on the Handicapped first presented a proposal for
comprehensive federal legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons
with disabilities in 1986. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD
INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING
PERSONS WrrH DiSABiLrIES WITH LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS (1986) [here-
inafter TowARD INDEPENDENCE]. The report found that the "[clomplexities, in-
consistencies, and fragmentation in the various Federal laws and programs
that affect Americans with disabilities might suggest that the United States
has no coherent Federal policy on disability." Id. at 7. Another flaw in federal
policies regarding persons with disabilities was that federal programs overem-
phasized income support and underemphasized programs promoting opportuni-
ties and independence. Id. at vi.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. V 1993).
8. The purpose of the ADA is to "provide a clear and comprehensive na-
tional mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities," and "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards ad-
dressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities." Id.
§ 12101(b)(1)-(2).
9. See infra part H.B (describing differences between the ADA and Title
VII).
10. See infra part HA.2 (describing differences in definitions of discrimina-
tion used in the ADA and Title VIID.
11. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (describing the duty to
reasonably accommodate under the ADA).
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Green,12 which allocates the burden of proof in discrimination
cases brought under Title VI.13 Under the McDonnell Douglas
test, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of employment
discrimination, even though no direct evidence of discrimination
exists, which the defendant must rebut to avoid liability. :14 Ap-
plying the McDonnell Douglas test to ADA actions, however,
does not provide persons with disabilities with adequate protec-
tion from employment discrimination.
This Note addresses why the McDonnell Douglas test does
not provide an appropriate allocation of the burden of proof for
employment discrimination cases brought under the ADA. Part
I discusses the extent and causes of employment discrimination
against persons with disabilities, federal responses to this dis-
crimination in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the ADA, and
the various allocations of the -burden of proof under the McDon-
nell Douglas test and the Rehabilitation Act. Part II contends
that courts should not apply the McDonnell Douglas test in ADA
cases because of the unique causes of disability discrimination'15
and the substantial affirmative duty the ADA places on employ-
ers to accommodate the needs of disabled workers. 16 Further-
more, it argues that courts applying the McDonnell Douglas test
in ADA cases will unduly burden plaintiffs who bring employ-
ment discrimination cases under the ADA. Finally, Part III of-
fers an alternative allocation of the burden of proof that better
meets the ADA's goal of ensuring that the workplace remains
free of disability discrimination.
12. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
13. See, e.g., Deluca v. Winer Indus., No. 93-C-6535, 1994 WL 374197
(N.D. IMI. July 13, 1994); Flasza v. TNT Holland Motor Express, No. 93-C-7315,
1994 WL 529392 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1994); Braverman v. Penobscot Shoe Co.,
859 F. Supp. 596 (D. Me. 1994); Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp.
1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Harmer v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 831 F. Supp. 1300
(E.D. Va. 1993); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctr., No. CIV.A.3:93CV369, 1993 WL
730727 (E.D. Va. Oct. 26, 1993).
14. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
15. See infra part I-A.1 (comparing causes of discrimination against the
disabled to other types of discrimination).
16. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (outlining the duty to rea-
sonably accommodate under the ADA).
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I. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS
WITH DISABILITIES AND THE
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
A. Tm SCOPE OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS WITH
DISABLiTEs
Persons with disabilities constitute one of the largest, most
discriminated against groups within American society.17 Based
on the ADA's definition of disability, Congress estimated approx-
imately forty-three million Americans have a disability.18 Sta-
tistics demonstrate this population is "the poorest, least
educated, and largest minority in America."19 To begin to com-
prehend the nature of discrimination and its impact against the
disabled, one must first understand how society defines disabili-
ties and how this definition encourages society to discriminate
against persons with disabilities.
17. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314 (quoting Justin Dart, the chairperson
of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabili-
ties, testifying before the House Subcommittees on Select Education and Em-
ployment Opportunities, July 18, 1989). Dart argued that despite the
considerable progress society has made toward recognizing the rights of persons
with disabilities, "our society is still infected by the ancient, now almost subcon-
scious assumption that disabled persons are less than fully human and there-
fore are not fully eligible for the opportunities, services, and support systems
which are available to other people as a matter of right." Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993). According to experts, it is diffi-
cult to estimate accurately the number of Americans with disabilities. No na-
tional database of this type exists. SPEaTRUM, supra note 1, at 10. "Instead, ...
information must be culled from four distinct sources: service eligibility statis-
tics, service delivery statistics, population surveys, and ad hoc studies." Id.
Each of these sources has deficiencies. Not all of them use the same definition
of disability, and many base their numbers on people defining themselves as
disabled or on people who seek services. Id. at 10-13.
According to the National Center for Health Statistics, in the civilian,
noninstitutionalized population, 18.4 million people have orthopedic impair-
ments, 17 million have hearing impairments, 8.2 million have visual impair-
ments, 2.1 million suffer from speech impediments, and 1.2 million are partially
or completely paralyzed. TowARD INDEPENDENCE, supra note 6, at 6. Of the 9.5
million people regarded as having a developmental disability in 1978, approxi-
mately 60% were mentally retarded, 25% had epilepsy, and 10% had cerebral
palsy. SPECTRUM, supra note 1, at 15-16.
19. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), supra note 17, at 32-33, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 314 (quoting a statement by Vice President Bush on March 31,
1988).
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1. Causes of Discrimination Against Persons With
Disabilities
Persons with disabilities encompass a diverse group of indi-
viduals who experience a multitude of ailments.20 Even though
persons with disabilities do not share many similar traits,21 so-
ciety lumps them into one, all-inclusive category based on their
perceived inability to function in the mainstream way.22 In fact,
the ADA defines a disabled person as a person who has "a physi-
cal or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities... ; [has] a record of such an impair-
ment; or ... [is] regarded as having such an impairment."23
20. Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and the Rights of the Dis-
abled, 74 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1438 (1986). Rebell argues that unlike other pro-
tected classes, persons with disabilities do not share common physical,
psychological, or cultpral characteristics:
Rather, "the handicapped" include persons from all racial, sexual, age,
and class categories, who exhibit disabilities as diverse as blindness,
cerebral palsy, and emotional disturbances. Within each disability cat-
egory is a wide diversity of conditions and needs. These range, for ex-
ample, from the severely mentally retarded to the mildly learning
disabled, from wheelchair-bound paraplegics to clubfoot sufferers with
mild mobility impairments.
Id.
Even certain diseases or impairments present a wide range of disorders.
Epilepsy, for example, contains a range of seizure disorders. Some seizures,
such as grand mal, may last for several minutes, causing the person to become
unconscious, fall to the ground, and experience shaking movements. By con-
trast, people who experience petit mal seizures have an almost unnoticeable
loss of consciousness. SPECTRUM, supra note 1, at 88 n.5. Medical professionals
and advocates for persons with disabilities also do not agree on what consti-
tutes a disability. See THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE AMERICANS wITH
DisABLrris ACT: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GuIDE TO IMPACT, ENFORCEMENT,
AND COMPLIANCE 79-80 (1990) [hereinafter LEGAL GuIDEI (contrasting four cate-
gories of disabilities that the National Council of Disability has created with the
10 general categories of disabilities other authorities have created). Further-
more, medical professionals have repeatedly changed the definitions of disabili-
ties and continue to do so. For example, the American Association on Mental
Deficiency redefined "mental retardation" in 1973. Before 1973, the mentally
retarded included people whose scores on standardized tests were one standard
deviation below the norm. After redefinition, the group encompassed only those
who scored two standard deviations below the norm. As a result, about eight
million Americans, whom society formerly considered mentally retarded, no
longer belonged to that group. SPECTRUM, supra note 1, at 95.
21. SPECTRUM, supra note 1, at 4.
22. FRANK G. BowE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA: BARRIERS TO DISABLED PEO-
PLE 109 (1978). Bowe argues that the only characteristic persons with disabili-
ties share is a societal belief that they are different than able-bodied
individuals. Id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993).
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This socially constructed dichotomy divides people into two
groups: those who are able bodied and those who are not.24
The inaccurate stereotypes 25 generated by this ability-cen-
tered dichotomy are one cause of discrimination against persons
with disabilities.26 The focus on an individual's inability to per-
form a certain task in the mainstream way ignores the person as
an individual and his or her abilities.27 According to some com-
mentators, by focusing on a person's limitations and not the per-
son as an individual, society views persons with disabilities as
less than fully human.28 This leads able-bodied people to be-
lieve persons with disabilities have greater limitations on their
abilities than actually exist 29 and that they are unable to
24. SPECTRUM, supra note 1, at 87-89. This dichotomy, however, is not
based on reality. "Instead of two separate and distinct classes ... there are
spectrums of physical and mental abilities that range from superlative to mini-
mal or nonfunctional." Id.
25. Some psychologists have attempted to categorize the most common ste-
reotypes nondisabled persons assign to people with disabilities. These stereo-
types include: "1) the Subhuman Organism 2) the Menace 3) the Unspeakable
Object 4) the Object of Pity 5) the Holy Innocent 6) the Diseased Organism 7)
the Object of Ridicule, and 8) the Eternal Child." SPECTRUM, supra note 1, at 25
(quoting WOLF WOLFENSBERGER, THE PRINCIPLE OF NORMALiZATION IN HUMAN
SERVICE 16-24 (1972)).
Such inaccurate assumptions make it difficult for nondisabled people to see
the individual through the disability and recognize their full potential to work.
Id. at 93. In this sense, discrimination against persons with disabilities is simi-
lar to discrimination against people of color or women. See Jeffrey 0. Cooper,
Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities Act,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1427 (1991) (arguing social bias causes both discrimi-
nation against persons with disabilities and discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, or national origin).
26. See Bows, supra note 22, at viii-x (arguing that America, by designing
the nation for over 200 years without thinking about the needs of persons with
disabilities, has handicapped its people); Rebell, supra note 20, at 1452 (claim-
ing most barriers that the disabled face result from outdated assumptions
about their abilities).
27. SPECTRUM, supra note 1, at 89-91.
28. See, e.g., BowE, supra note 22, at 127. According to Bowe:
[M]any people refer to disabled individuals as "the deaf," "the blind,"
and "the mentally ill," as though all deaf people were alike, all blind
people similar, and all mentally ill persons identical. That more than a
mere quirk of language is involved may be seen in the fact that the
adjective-as-noun usage conspicuously deletes the humanizing
"people."
Id.
29. Because a person with a disability differs from the physical or mental
norm, people often make a value judgment that the difference is significant and
very negative. "Far from being a response to an inflexible fact about biology,
our perception of a handicap nearly always reflects an arbitrary, unconscious
decision to treat normal social function and the possession of any handicap as
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work.30 Studies, however, have disproved these beliefs. These
studies have also shown that workers with disabilities have
equal or better job performance than their nondisabled
coworkers.3 1
Another source of discrimination against persons with disa-
bilities is the basic structure of society.32 American society
tends to meet the needs of able-bodied individuals,33 and only
recently has it begun to consider the needs of persons with disa-
bilities. Although society has not consciously excluded persons
with disabilities, persons with disabilities nevertheless live in a
world not suited to or designed for them.
mutually exclusive." SPECTRUM, supra note 1, at 27 (quoting JOHN GLIEDMAN &
WILLIAM ROTH, THE UNEXPECTED MINORITY: HANDICAPPED CHILDREN IN
AMERICA 24, 30 (1980)). Cf. Drimmer, supra note 1, at 1356-58 (arguing that
limitations on persons with disabilities are not inevitable, rather they result
from societal policies).
30. As the Supreme Court recognized in School Bd. v. Arline, "Congress
acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and
disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from ac-
tual impairment." 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). Indeed, according to the House
Report:
The social consequences that have attached to being disabled often
bear no relationship to the physical or mental limitations imposed by
the disability. For example, being paralyzed has meant far more than
being unable to walk-it has meant being excluded from public
schools, being denied employment opportunities, and being deemed an
"unfit parent."
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), supra note 17, at 41, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 323 (quoting Arlene Mayerson of the Disability Rights Education and De-
fense Fund).
31. The United States Civil Service Commission studied appointments of
severely handicapped workers in federal agency jobs over a 10-year period. It
found the employment records of the disabled employees to be excellent. SPEC-
TRUm, supra note 1, at 30. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., in conducting a
study of its disabled workers, concluded that its employees with disabilities "are
equivalent to [DuPont's] other employees in job performance, attendance, and
safety". LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 3 (quoting the DuPont report).
32. Cf. Murphy, supra note 3, at 1613 (arguing society often constructs lim-
itations on a disabled person's ability to work). "Jobs and buildings are
designed around the norm of average, able-bodied adults, to the detriment of
those who do not fit this description." Id.
33. BowE, supra note 22, at viii, 74. "For two hundred years, we have
designed a nation for the average, normal, able-bodied majority, little realizing
that millions cannot enter many of our buildings, ride our subways and buses,
enjoy our educational and recreational programs and facilities, and use our
communication systems." Id. at viii.
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2. Employment Discrimination Against Persons With
Disabilities
The vast majority of persons with disabilities would like to
work, but only a small percentage of them actually do.3 4 Despite
their desire to work, persons with disabilities are less likely to
hold jobs now than they were a decade ago, and those who do
work have lost earning power.3 5 Persons with disabilities expe-
rience limited job opportunities because they can only get part-
time work,3 6 and only certain types of employers, such as those
in the service industry, will hire them.37
Such bleak employment prospects persist because large
numbers of persons with disabilities face frequent employment
discrimination. 38 Surveys indicate twenty-five percent of dis-
abled Americans have encountered employment discrimination
because of their disability.3 9 More important, however, seventy-
five percent of managers and businesses reported that persons
with disabilities "often encounter job discrimination from em-
34. Unemployment rates for the disabled are estimated to be between 50%
and 75%. SPECTRUM, supra note 1, at 29. According to a Louis Harris poll, two-
thirds of "all disabled Americans between the age of 16 and 64 are mot [sic]
working at all; yet, a large majority of those not working say they want to
work." H.R. REP. No. 101-485(H1), supra note 17, at 32, reprinted in 1990
U.S.O.C.A.N. at 314. Sixty-six percent of working-age persons with disabilities
who are not working say that they would like to have a job. Id.
35. Study on Disabled and Jobs Finds Work and Good Pay Are Scarce, N.Y.
TImEs, Aug. 16, 1989, at A22. M"e percentage of disabled men who work full
time dropped from 29.8 in 1981 to 23.4 in [1988]." Id. In 1980, men with disa-
bilities earned 23% less than men with no work disability, and by 1988, this
difference increased to 36%. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), supra note 17, at 32,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 314. In 1980, women with disabilities earned
30% less than women with no disabilities, and by 1988, this difference had in-
creased to 38%. Id.
36. Disabled workers are more than twice as likely to work part time than
are nondisabled workers. Bows, supra note 22, at 31. Most disabled workers,
however, can work eight-hour days, five days a week. Id.
37. Persons with disabilities are much more likely to work below their abil-
ities, as measured by their education levels, than are nondisabled individuals.
In addition, a far greater percentage of disabled workers are in the secondary
labor force. Bows, supra note 22, at 28. For disabled people who have less than
12 years of education, the average wage rate is below minimum wage. SPEC-
TRUM, supra note 1, at 31. Even persons with disabilities who have been
through vocational rehabilitation programs are likely to obtain employment
that is seasonal or part-time and pays at or below minimum wage. Id. at 179.
38. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (discussing cases concern-
ing various types of employment discrimination).
39. LEGAL Gums, supra note 20, at 27. In addition, 47% of the participants
in the survey who were not employed or not employed full time said that they
were not working full time largely because "employers would not recognize they
were capable of holding a full-time job because of their disability." Id. at 27-28.
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ployers."40 Claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act,41
which prevents disability discrimination in federal employment,
substantiate this fact. In these cases, employers readily admit
they discriminated against the disabled plaintiff.42
Yet even though employers admit to discriminating against
persons with disabilities, nondisabled people deny being
prejudiced against them. Studies have revealed that most able-
bodied persons mask their true feelings about persons with disa-
bilities.43 Although nondisabled people claim they do not harbor
ill feelings toward the disabled, their behavior reveals they are
uncomfortable around, embarrassed by, or afraid of persons
with disabilities. 44 These attitudes appear when employers
make business decisions regarding persons with disabilities. 45
40. Id. at 28. Another survey of businesses in Los Angeles found "employer
attitudes toward persons with disabilities were less favorable than those to-
ward any other prospective group of applicants surveyed, including elderly indi-
viduals, minority-group members, ex-convicts, and student radicals." Bows,
supra note 22, at 175.
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 710-796 (Supp. V 1993).
42. See Judith W. Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered:
Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. Rv. 401, 433 n.95 (1984) (argu-
ing that the lack of nonintentional discrimination case law under the Rehabili-
tation Act reflects the fact that defendants often readily admit that the
individual's handicap gives grounds for exclusion or other discriminatory con-
duct, thus clearly evidencing intent); Murphy, supra note 3, at 1637 (arguing
that in most cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act, employers use the
plaintiff's disability as a justification for a particular employment action). Like-
wise, in Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981), the court
found that in most cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the defendant
acknowledged taking the plaintiff's handicap into account in making its
decision.
43. In one study, interviewers asked participants about their views of dis-
abled people. At least 50% "expressted] attitudes toward disability that are at
least mildly positive, almost half express[ed] neutral feelings, and few admitted
negative reactions." BoWE, supra note 22, at 126. The researchers then ex-
posed participants to persons with disabilities and studied their physiological
reactions, such as pulse rate, sweating, and eye movements. Id. In this case,
"most exhibited considerable discomfort, nervousness, avoidance of eye contact,
and other symptoms of negative reactions." Id.
44. Id.
45. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (citing examples of employ-
ment discrimination against the disabled).
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B. FEDERAL RESPONSES TO EMPLOYMENT DIsCRMINATION
AGANST TrE DISABLED
1. The Rehabilitation Act
Although persons with disabilities have long been victims of
employment discrimination, Congress only recently prohibited
employers from discriminating based on disability. By enacting
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress outlawed em-
ployment discrimination based on race, religion, sex, and na-
tional origin, but not discrimination based on disability.46 In
fact, Congress defeated attempts to amend Title VII to protect
persons with disabilities. 47 Persons with disabilities finally re-
ceived some legal redress when Congress enacted the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973, ("Act"),48 which protected federal employees
with disabilities from discrimination. 49
The Act 5° prohibits all federal government employers, con-
tractors with the federal government, and other employers who
receive federal funds from discriminating against persons with
disabilities.51 Such an employer may not "limit, segregate, or
classify applicants or employees or participants in any way that
adversely affects their opportunities or status because of handi-
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an em-
ployer to "refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges or employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
47. In 1972, Rep. Charles Vanik tried to amend Title VII to "make discrimi-
nation because of physical or mental handicap in employment an unlawful em-
ployment practice, unless there is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operations of that particular business or
enterprise." LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 13-14.
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 710-796 (1988).
49. Because of the lack of case law on the ADA, courts have looked to how
other courts have interpreted the Rehabilitation Act for guidance. See, e.g.,
Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 851 F. Supp. 353, 359 (W.D. Wis.
1994) (noting how courts should look to Rehabilitation Act in interpreting the
ADA); Easly v. Snider, 841 F. Supp. 668, 671-72 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (same); EEOC
v. AIC Sec. Investigation, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (same).
In addition, the Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to read, "itihe stan-
dards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a complaint
alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards
applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act." 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)
(Supp. V 1993). The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA also define terms simi-
larly and prohibit the same types of discrimination against the disabled. See
infra note 66 and accompanying text (citing both ADA's and Rehabilitation
Act's definition of a person with a disability).
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-794 (Supp. V 1993).
51. This was the first federal act to prohibit employment discrimination
against the disabled. See id. § 794(a).
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cap."52 The Act outlaws intentional discrimination as well as ac-
tions or policies that disproportionately impact persons with
disabilities. 53
The Act places an affirmative duty on employers to "make
reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental lim-
itations of an [applicant or employee]." 54 Employers must ac-
commodate an employee's disability unless they can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on their operations. 55 Reasonable accommodations do
not include "mak[ing] 'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifica-
tions to accommodate the handicapped."56
The Rehabilitation Act, however, does not apply to private
employers. 57 The Act did not significantly decrease discrimina-
tion against the disabled.58 Perhaps this is because the Act's
differing burdens on different employers confused people. For
example, under § 504 of the Act, private employers receiving
federal funds had to make reasonable accommodations for their
disabled workers.59 On the other hand, § 501 required the same
of all federal agencies, but it also required that federal agencies
create affirmative action plans to increase the number of dis-
52. 29 C.F.R. § 32.12(a)(2) (1994). The regulations go on to list the specific
activities of employers to which the Rehabilitation Act applies. Id.
§ 32.12(b)(1)-(9).
53. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 297 (1985). The Court, however,
refused to hold that all disparate-impact showings constitute a prima facie case
under the Act. Instead, the Act "reaches at least some conduct that has an
unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped." Id. at 299.
54. 29 C.F.R. § 32.13(a) (1994); see also School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,
288 (1987) (noting that one necessary inquiry by the court is "whether the em-
ployer could reasonably accommodate the employee under the established
standards").
55. 29 C.F.R. § 32.13(a). In determining whether an accommodation would
be an undue burden, the court should consider the following factors:
(1) The overall size of the recipients program with respect to number
of employees, number of participants, number and type of facilities,
and size of budget;
(2) The type of the recipient's operation, including the composition and
structure of the recipient's workforce, and duration and type of train-
ing program; and
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed.
Id. § 32.13(b).
56. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
58. LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 20, at 26-27 (discussing how federal laws
prior to the ADA did not significantly reduce widespread discrimination against
the disabled).
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
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abled workers they employed.60 In 1990, Congress enacted the
Americans with Disabilities Act to combat these shortcomings.
61
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Congress intended the ADA "to provide a clear and compre-
hensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities."62 To achieve this goal, the
ADA prevents private as well as public employers from discrimi-
nating against persons with disabilities. 63 Specifically, title I of
the ADA prohibits employers with more than fifteen workers
64
from discriminating against a qualified applicant or employee on
the basis of disability.65 As defined by the ADA, a person with a
disability is any person who has a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,
has a record of such impairment, or is regarded as having such
an impairment. 66 The ADA does not prohibit all discrimination
60. Id. § 791.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. V 1993).
62. Id. § 12101(b)(1).
63. Id. § 12111(5)(A).
64. Id. "The term employer means a person engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." Id. Con-
gress phased in the ADA to apply to more and more employers. From 1992 to
1994, the ADA applied to employers with 25 or more employees. Id.
65. Id. § 12112(a). This protection extends to 'job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id.
66. Id. § 12102(2). The ADA defines a "physical or mental impairment" as:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (in-
cluding speech organs), cardiovascular reproductive, digestive, genito-
urinary, henic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). The term "substantially limits" means being:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform; or
(ii) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity
as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform that same major
life activity.
Id. § 1630.2(j). A person is "regarded as having a record of such an impairment"
if he or she:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constitut-
ing such limitation;
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against persons with disabilities, but only discrimination
against "qualified individuals."67 A "qualified individual" is a
person who, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position."68
To help clarify what activities the ADA proscribes, the ADA
lists many actions that constitute discrimination based on disa-
bility. For example, an employer cannot limit, segregate, or
classify an applicant or employee in an adverse manner based
on disability.69 It cannot "use standards, criteria, or methods of
administration... that have the effect of discriminating on the
basis of disability." 70 Finally, employers cannot "use qualifica-
tion standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that
screen out or tend to screen out an individual ... or class of
individuals" based on their disabilities. 7 '
The ADA also places on employers the affirmative duty to
make reasonable accommodations to the known physical and
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability. 72 Reasonable accommodations consist of modifying or
adjusting the application process, the work environment, or the
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits ma-jor life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such
impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in... this section but is
treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting
impairment.
Id. § 1630.2(1). "Major life activities" consist of "functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working." Id. § 1630.2(i).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
68. Id. § 12111(8). Thus, the ADA rejects the Court's interpretation under
the Rehabilitation Act of what constitutes a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979)
(defining an otherwise qualified person with a disability as "one who is able to
meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap"). Instead of re-
quiring that a disabled individual be able to perform the essential functions of
his job in spite of his impairment, the ADA requires employers to consider the
abilities of a disabled applicant or employee after it has made reasonable ac-
commodations to meet the needs of his disability.
"Essential functions" of the employment position are "the fundamental job
duties of the employment position .... [The term] does not include the margi-
nal functions of the position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). Courts should give consid-
eration, however, "to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are
essential." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
69. Id. § 12112(b)(1).
70. Id. § 12112(b)(3).
71. Id. § 12112(b)(6).
72. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA prohibits refusing to hire a job applicant
who is otherwise qualified because the employer does not wish to make reason-
able accommodations for her disability. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
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responsibilities of the position such that an individual with a
disability can perform the job.73
An employer does not have to make these accommodations
if it can show that the required adjustments would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business. 74 The ADA
defines undue hardship as an "action requiring significant diffi-
culty or expense" on the part of the employer.75 In determining
whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship,
the ADA instructs courts to consider the nature and the cost of
the necessary accommodation, the overall financial resources of
the facility, the impact the accommodation would have on the
facility, and the type of the employer's operations.7 6
C. BURDEN OF PROOF OF DisCRVmATION UNDER rM ADA
The ADA does not state clearly what a plaintiff must prove
to prevail on a claim of intentional employment discrimina-
tion.77 Recognizing the similarities between the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA, courts have looked to cases construing the Re-
73. The ADA provides several examples of what constitutes "reasonable ac-
commodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12111. For example, such accommodation might in-
clude making existing facilities readily accessible, acquiring or modifying
equipment, restructuring job duties, modifying work schedules, adjusting train-
ing materials or policies, or providing qualified readers or interpreters. Id. The
federal regulations interpreting the ADA further describe "reasonable accom-
modation" as:
(1) Modifications or adjustments to a job application process that en-
able a qualified individual with a disability to be considered for the
position;
(2) Modifications or adjustments to the work environment or to the
manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is
customarily performed... ; or
(3) Modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity's em-
ployee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of em-
ployment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees
without disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (1994).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A).
75. Id. § 12111(10). The ADA applies the same standard as the Rehabilita-
tion Act for when a business can refuse to make a reasonable accommodation.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text (describing the definition of undue
hardship under the Rehabilitation Act).
76. Id. § 12111(10)(B). Employers might argue that any expenditure on ac-
commodations for persons with disabilities creates an undue hardship because
such expenditures would not be necessary for able-bodied employees. However,
the ADA rejects this interpretation of undue hardship by requiring that courts
consider the cost of an accommodation in conjunction with the employer's finan-
cial resources. See id.
77. See id. § 12112(a).
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habilitation Act for guidance in interpreting the ADA. 78 Unfor-
tunately, the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the
proper allocation of the burden of proof in employment discrimi-
nation cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act. Some circuit
courts apply the McDonnell Douglas79 allocation of the burden
of production for Title VII claims to employment discrimination
cases brought under the Rehabilitation Act.80 Other circuit
courts allocate the burden of proof without regard for the Mc-
Donnell Douglas test.8 ' Out of this murky precedent, some re-
cent court decisions have relied on the McDonnell Douglas test
in allocating the burden of proof in claims brought under the
ADA. 8 2
1. The McDonnell Douglas Test
Title VII plaintiffs initially struggled to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination because direct evidence of employ-
ment discrimination often did not exist.83 To eliminate this
problem, the Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
78. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (citing similarities between
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).
79. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing the four-part test for determin-
ing whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination).
80. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the
McDonnell Douglas analysis is appropriate for claims brought under the Act
when employer asserts that it failed to hire or promote plaintiff for reasons un-
related to his or her handicap), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1538 (1994); Johnson v.
Minnesota Historical Soe'y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1242 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the McDonnell Douglas guidelines apply to cases arising under the Rehabilita-
tion Act); Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding the
elements of prima facie case of discrimination established under McDonnell
Douglas applied to claims broaught under Rehabilitation Act).
81. See, e.g., Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th
Cir. 1985) (holding that once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the em-
ployer must prove the "challenged criteria are job related and required by busi-
ness necessity and that reasonable accommodation is not possible"); Treadwell
v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 475 (11th Cir. 1983) (same); Prewitt v. United
States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that an employer
has burden to prove that it cannot reasonably accommodate plaintiff because
doing so would cause an undue hardship); Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of
Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1386 (10th Cir 1981) (holding that once plaintiff estab-
lishes prima facie, that the employer has the burden of proving that the plain-
tiff was not otherwise qualified or that her rejection was for reasons other than
her handicap).
82. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (listing cases that have ap-
plied the McDonnell Douglas test to ADA cases).
83. "[The) entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to
compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is
hard to come by." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Green,8 4 created a structure for plaintiffs to establish a prima
facie case of intentional employment discrimination without di-
rect evidence of discrimination.85
Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a Title VII plaintiff
may establish a prima facie case of discrimination even absent
direct evidence by showing that she belongs to a protected class,
that she was qualified for, applied for, and was denied a position
or promotion, and that after her rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applications from per-
sons with the plaintiff's qualifications.8 6
If the plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, the burden
of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.8 7 The employer need
not persuade the court that its proffered reasons motivated its
actions.88 Instead, the employer only needs to produce admissi-
ble evidence upon which the jury could reasonably conclude that
discriminatory animus had not motivated the employer.8 9
84. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
85. Id. at 802.
86. Id. The Court noted that this standard is not inflexible. "The facts nec-
essarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima
facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every re-
spect to differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13. Courts interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act have used this four-part test to establish a prima facie case
of disability discrimination as well. See, e.g., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d
761, 774 (2d Cir. 1981).
87. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. "Placing this burden of produc-
tion on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1980).
88. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254
89. Id. at 255 n.8. The Court stated the rationale behind allocating the
burdens of proof in this manner was "intended progressively to sharpen the
inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Id.
Some courts interpreting the Rehabilitation Act have followed this exact
analysis when the defendant has denied taking the plaintiff's disability into
account while making its employment decision. Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d
113, 116-17 (8th Cir. 1985). In Norcross, the school board claimed it did not
hire a visually impaired plaintiff because she had less experience than the
nondisabled person the board hired. Id. Although the school board admitted to
discussing her disability, it claimed the plaintiff was its second choice. Id. The
court found this explanation to be a legitimate reason for not hiring the plain-
tiff. Id.
Some courts have also followed this analysis in Rehabilitation Act claims
where the defendant admitted to relying on the plaintiff's disability in making
its employment decision. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(upholding placing the burden of persuasion on plaintiff to prove that she can
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If the employer alleges a legitimate reason for its actions,
the employer rebuts the presumption of discrimination and it
drops from the case.90 The trier of fact must then decide the
ultimate question of the case: "whether ... the defendant inten-
tionally discriminated against [the employee]."91 At all times,
the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer intention-
ally discriminated against her.9 2 To persuade the fact finder on
this issue, the plaintiff can present evidence demonstrating that
the employer's proffered reason is unworthy of credence. 93 A re-
jection of the employer's reason, however, does not compel a
judgment for the plaintiff.94
perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommo-
dations, and giving the defendant only the burden of production to show plain-
tiff is not qualified for the position), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1538 (1994); Doe v.
New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981). In Doe, the defendant
claimed the plaintiff was not qualified because of her disability and, therefore,
the University did not have to attempt to reasonably accommodate her disabil-
ity. Id. at 769-70. The court held that once a plaintiff established a prima facie
case, "the institution or employer... [has to go] forward with evidence that the
handicap is relevant to qualifications for the position sought." Id. at 776.
Under this analysis, the University had to offer evidence that the plaintiff's
mental illness affected her qualifications for medical school. Id. at 777. The
University did not, however, have to address whether it could reasonably ac-
commodate the plaintiff so that she would be able to perform in medical school.
Id.
90. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10 (1980)). This does not mean, however, that the
jury cannot consider evidence the plaintiff already introduced as part of her
prima facie case.
91. Id. at 2749.
92. Id.
93. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. In Norcross, the school board discussed the
plaintiff's disability. Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 116-17 (8th Cir. 1982).
However, the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit found this evidence insuffi-
cient to prove the employer intentionally discriminated against her based on
her disability or to cast sufficient doubt upon the employer's proffered reason for
its decision. Id. The plaintiff could have argued that the school board's discus-
sion of her disability was evidence that it relied on her disability in making its
decision. Furthermore, she could have presented evidence that the person
eventually hired did not have more experience than she did.
94. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 In Hicks, the district court, in a bench trial,
found that the reasons the defendant gave were not the real reasons for the
plaintiff's demotion and discharge. Id. at 2748 n.2. Despite this finding, the
court was not persuaded that the plaintiff was the victim of intentional race
discrimination. Id. Several considerations led to this conclusion, "including the
fact that two blacks sat on the disciplinary review board that recommended
disciplining respondent, that respondents black subordinates who actually
committed the violations were not disciplined, and that 'the number of black
employees at St. Mary's remained constant.'" Id.
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2. Alternative Methods of Allocating the Burden of Proof
Some courts do not apply the McDonnell Douglas test to Re-
habilitation Act cases.9 5 Rather, they apply alternative alloca-
tions of the burden of production and the burden of persuasion
that vary depending on the type of discrimination the plaintiff
alleges. If the employer admits it did not hire the plaintiff be-
cause of her disability,96 these courts require the plaintiff to first
make her prima facie case by establishing that she is a qualified
individual with a disability who can perform the essential func-
tions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations.97
The employer can avoid liability only by showing that it would
be an undue hardship to reasonably accommodate the plain-
tiff98 As with other affirmative defenses, the employer has the
burden of persuasion. 99
Another approach involves an employer who admits taking
the plaintiff's disability into account, but claims the plaintiff is
not qualified for the job.100 To establish a claim of disability dis-
crimination under this approach, a plaintiff must first show he is
otherwise qualified for the position sought and the defendant re-
jected him solely because of his handicap. 10 1 If the plaintiff suc-
cessfully proves he is otherwise qualified for the position, the
95. Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1249-50 (6th Cir.
1985); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 475 (11th Cir. 1983); Prewitt v.
United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 305-07 (5th Cir. 1981); Pushkin v.
Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1386 (10th Cir 1981).
96. See, e.g., Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 308.
97. See id. at 306.
98. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288-89 (1987) (holding that the ulti-
mate issue was whether the defendant could reasonably accommodate the
plaintiff's tuberculosis); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(holding that when an agency invokes the affirmative defense of inability to
reasonably accommodate, the defendant should have the burden of proving un-
due hardship), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1538 (1994); Prewitt, 662 F.2d at 308.
The Prewitt court goes on to state that once the employer meets its burden, "the
plaintiff has the burden of coming forward with evidence concerning his individ-
ual capabilities and suggestions for possible accommodations to rebut the em-
ployer's evidence." Id.
99. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
100. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit created an alternative anal-
ysis for a Rehabilitation Act claim in Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo.,
658 F.2d 1372, 1386-87 (10th Cir. 1981), because it believed disability discrimi-
nation differs significantly from other types of discrimination and thus de-
mands a different approach.
101. Id. at 1385. In Pushkin, the plaintiff demonstrated his qualifications
for a position in the psychiatric residency program, despite his multiple sclero-
sis, by proving that he met the necessary requirements and that he had been
practicing medicine at the time he applied. Id. at 1387.
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employer then has the burden of proving that the applicant was
not otherwise qualified regardless of his handicap, or that his
rejection from the position was for reasons other than his
handicap.10 2
H. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS IN
ADA CASES
A. COMPARING DIscRImNATION AGAINST PERSONS WITH
DisABnXmES TO OTHER FoRms OF DisCRI[INATION
Discrimination against persons with disabilities differs
greatly from the type of discrimination Title VII proscribes. As
such, it is inaccurate to assume courts should apply Title VIrs
burden of proof allocations to ADA cases simply because they
both deal with employment discrimination. Unfortunately,
courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to ADA
cases without taking into account these differences and without
considering whether another framework for the burden of proof
might be more appropriate. 103
102. Id. The defendant in this case, the University of Colorado, failed to
meet this burden because its hiring committee ranked Pushkin low based on its
belief that his disability would upset patients or would prevent him from per-
forming the job. Id. at 1388-89. The court in Barth v. Gelb used the same anal-
ysis, but held the employer only had to produce evidence to refute that the
plaintiff could perform the job. 2 F.3d 1180, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1538 (1994). In the end, the burden of persuasion remained with the
plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she could perform the
job, with or without reasonable accommodation. Id.
103. Unfortunately, most courts applying McDonnell Douglas to both the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA have failed to do this. See infra part H.C (dis-
cussing lack of analysis in cases applying the McDonnell Douglas test under the
Rehabilitation Act); Mark E. Martin, Accommodating the Handicapped: The
Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55
N.Y.U. L. Rv. 881, 887-88 (1980). Martin argues that courts, in interpreting
the Rehabilitation Act, "have not based their decisions on an explicit analysis of
the meaning of discrimination against the handicapped." Id. at 887. As a re-
sult, the case law fails to adequately explore the implications of preventing dis-
crimination on the basis of disability.
Recently, courts interpreting the ADA have failed in similar respects. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text (listing courts that have applied the Mc-
Donnell Douglas test to employment discrimination claims brought under the
ADA). Not one of these courts discusses why it was appropriate to apply the
McDonnell Douglas test to the ADA claims. See id. The closest a court has
come to addressing this issue was in Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, No. CIV.A.93-
4510, 1994 WL 454813 (E.D. Pa. 1994). After indicating that the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had not yet set out the
elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the district
court chose to follow the precedent of Title VII because it believed that the stat-
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1. Comparing Causes of Disability Discrimination With
Causes of Race and Gender Discrimination
The causes of discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties are similar to those of race and gender discrimination, such
as inaccurate assumptions and stereotypes. 10 4 Just as an em-
ployer might refuse to hire female managers because he thinks
women are too emotional and cower under pressure, an em-
ployer might also refuse to hire persons with disabilities because
he assumes, based on stereotypes, that they will be unable to
perform the job satisfactorily. 105 Because of stereotypes and in-
accurate assumptions, employers erroneously believe a disabil-
ity limits a person's ability to work more than it actually does.1
0 6
Despite these similarities, discrimination against persons
with disabilities and other forms of discrimination also have
very distinct causes. Frequently, hatred fuels discrimination
against people of color and women.' 0 7 Evil intent, however, does
not usually motivate people when they discriminate against in-
dividuals with disabilities.' 08 For example, when the Postal
Service refused to rehire a disabled worker,' 09 it did so because
the employee could not lift his arms above his head, not because
it harbored ill will towards persons with disabilities. As a re-
sult, the Postal Service erroneously believed that it was impossi-
utes were "in pari materia guidance," that is, they were related to the same
purpose and should be construed together. Id. at *18 n.5.
104. See supra.notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing how stere-
otypical attitudes cause discrimination against both persons with disabilities
and people of color).
105. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (detailing the pervasive-
ness of employment discrimination against the disabled).
106. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (noting. that employers
often believe persons with disabilities are more limited than they actually are).
107. See Wegner, supra note 42, at 429. Wegner argues that malevolence
motivates people to deny people of color equal opportunity, while ill will does
not motivate people to deny persons with disabilities equal opportunity. Id. In-
stead, society denies disabled individuals equal opportunity by failing to con-
sider how policies might affect them, or by feeling awkward around persons
with disabilities. Id.
108. See, e.g., Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1385
(10th Cir. 1981) (discussing evil intent). According to the Tenth Circuit:
It would be a rare case indeed in which a hostile discriminatory pur-
pose or subjective intent to discriminate solely on the basis of handicap
could be shown. Discrimination on the basis of handicap usually re-
sults from more invidious causative elements and often occurs under
the guise of extending a helping hand or a mistaken, restrictive belief
as to the limitations of handicapped persons.
Id.
109. Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 297-98 (5th Cir.
1981).
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ble for the disabled employee to perform the job.110  Thus,
benign neglect or ignorance of the needs of persons with disabili-
ties is a primary cause of discrimination against the disabled.L"
2. Comparison of the Definitions of Discrimination Under the
ADA and Title VII
Not only do unique factors cause disability discrimination,
but Congress also defines an act of discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities differently it does an act of discrimination
against women or persons of color. In passing Title VII, Con-
gress believed that race, sex, religion, and national origin were
usually unrelated to an individual's ability to perform a job." 12
According to the definition of discrimination used in Title VII,
race or gender cannot motivate employers to any extent when
they make employment decisions."13 Although Title VII allows
reliance on protected traits in narrow circumstances, such as
when bona fide occupational qualifications exist,"34 such affirm-
ative defenses do not apply to all of the protected classes. For
110. Id. In this case, the Postal Service required that its employees be able
to lift their arms above their shoulders because mail carriers have to remove
stacks of mail off a six-foot high ledge. Id. at 305. The Postal Service admitted,
however, that Prewitt could be accommodated simply by lowering the legs to
which the shelves are attached. Id. Because the Postal Service did not consider
the needs of an individual with a mobility limitation, it designed six-foot
shelves.
111. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985) (discussing
society's neglect of persons with disabilities).
112. See Wegner, supra note 42, at 441-42. Wegner argues that disability
discrimination differs from race discrimination because, while race is irrelevant
to ability, disability is not. Id. at 442. As a result, a finely tuned inquiry is
necessary to develop an antidiscrimination scheme directed at eliminating dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities. Id.
113. Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to clearly state that any considera-
tion of these protected traits is illegal. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. V 1993). The act now contains a provision that
states, "except as otherwise provided ... an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice." Id.
114. Title VII allows employers to defend discrimination claims based on a
classifications of sex, religion, or national origin if the employer can prove that
such a classification is "a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." Id.
§ 200e-2(e) (Supp. V 1993). As implied by the language of Title Vfl, race will
never be considered a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ7).
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example, an employer cannot claim race or color as a bona fide
occupational qualification.115
By contrast, in passing the ADA, Congress recognized that a
disability may legitimately affect an individual's ability to per-
form a job. This characteristic, unlike a person's gender or race,
becomes relevant in determining whether a person is qualified
for the position. 11 6 The ADA's definition of discrimination al-
lows employers to consider an individual's disability when mak-
ing employment decisions.11 7 The ADA would not, for example,
require a bus company to hire a blind driver. Instead, the ADA
prohibits an employer's excessive reliance on the disability; an
employer cannot assume, based on stereotypes, that a disability
makes a person unqualified for the job.' 18 Unlike the bus com-
pany, a school district may not, per se, refuse to hire a visually
impaired school teacher. A visual impairment does not prevent
an individual from performing a teacher's job, 1 9 nor does it pose
threat to the safety of the students. 120 Recognizing that such
115. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing Title VIrs
BFOQ defense).
116. Some courts, in interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, have commented
on this distinguishing factor. In Doe v. New York University, the court noted:
[Slince an institution or employer is permitted to take into considera-
tion an applicant's handicap in deciding whether he or she is qualified,
a section 504 action frequently does not lend itself easily to the analy-
sis used for allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof
used in suits alleging discrimination based on impermissible factors
... in violation of Title VII.
666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981).
117. The ADA prevents employers from discriminating against a "qualified
individual with a disability." See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the ADA's definition of these terms). An employer may, in certain cir-
cumstances, consider an individual's disability in determining whether or not
that person is qualified for the job. If, however, the individual can perform the
job, with or without reasonable accommodation, the employer may not base its
employment decision on the fact that the applicant has a disability.
118. Additionally, an employer must assess whether alternative methods
exist to perform the job such that a disabled employee could discharge these
duties. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (describing the duty to
reasonably accommodate persons with disabilities). The entire process of rea-
sonable accommodation requires that an employer recognize a disability and
treat that person differently because of her disability.
119. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding
that a school district's policy of refusing to allow blind applicants to take a
teaching qualifying exam violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by creating an irrefutable presumption that blind individuals are
incompetent to teach sighted students).
120. The ADA does not require employers to hire an individual if the appli-
cant poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. A direct threat is "a
significant risk to health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by rea-
sonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3).
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limitations are inherent in disabilities, the ADA permits em-
ployers to consider a person's disability in making employment
decisions.
3. The Impact of These Differences in Determining the
Applicability of the McDonnell Douglas Test to the
ADA
Disability discrimination and race or gender discrimination
are significantly different types of discrimination. As a result, it
is problematic to apply tests developed specifically for proving
race or gender discrimination to disability discrimination
claims. 121 The Court did not design the McDonnell Douglas test
to acknowledge the complex interaction between a person's disa-
bility and that person's ability to perform a job. As scholars
have noted, d]iscrimination against the handicapped poses
unique problems because the trait that gives rise to the pro-
tected status also limits an individual's ability to function."122
Courts, therefore, must scrutinize an employer's explanations
for not hiring a disabled person more strictly than they scruti-
nize an employer's decisions under Title VII claims. In particu-
lar, courts presiding over ADA cases must strive to discover
whether the employer accurately concluded, without prejudice,
that the applicant did not possess the qualifications for the job;
or whether inaccurate assumptions that the disability might
limit an applicant's ability to perform the job influenced the em-
ployment decision.
121. One judge aptly commented that "attempting to fit the problem of dis-
crimination against the handicapped into the model remedy for race discrimi-
nation is akin to fitting a square peg into a round hole." Garrity v. Gallen, 522
F. Supp. 171, 206 (D.N.H. 1981).
122. Martin, supra note 103, at 883. Professor Martin further explained
that "[t]his link suggests that discrimination against the handicapped, unlike
discrimination against other groups, necessarily encompasses more than differ-
ential treatment caused by prejudicial attitudes. A full definition of discrimina-
tion must address both the problem of prejudicial attitudes and the limitation
caused by the handicap itself." Id. People with disabilities encounter four dif-
ferent classes of exclusionary barriers. Id. Like other victims of discrimination,
society excludes them because of social bias and prejudice. Id. In addition, neu-
tral standards that may not have been designed to exclude persons with disabil-
ities, nevertheless, when applied, tend to screen out persons with disabilities.
Id. "Surmountable impairment barriers" are exclusionary barriers caused by
the individual's disability that would not prevent the person from performing
the job if the employer reasonably accommodated him. Id. "Insurmountable
impairment barriers" are exclusionary barriers caused by an individual's disa-
bility that an employer cannot overcome with accommodation. Id. at 883-84.
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Although any plaintiff has difficulties proving discrimina-
tion without direct evidence, a disabled plaintiff faces a virtually
insurmountable barrier under the McDonnell Douglas test be-
cause its allocation of the burden of proof is too rigid. The
Supreme Court designed the McDonnell Douglas test to expose
an employer's reliance on certain protected traits. 23 Thus, the
test determines an "either/or" proposition: either the defendant
relied on a protected class in making its employment decision, or
it did not.
This either/or dichotomy is often inappropriate for an ADA
plaintiff who must not only show that his disability motivated
the defendant, but also how and to what degree it influenced the
employer's decision.124 Thus, an appropriate framework must
compel employers to demonstrate that they did not rely on inac-
curate stereotypes about persons with disabilities in making
their employment decision.
Because of its inadequacies, the McDonnell Douglas test
will never provide an appropriate framework. In ADA cases,
McDonnell Douglas's low burden of production on the defendant
defers too much to a defendant's explanations for its actions. 125
This low burden of production allows employers to make stere-
otypical assumptions about persons with disabilities 126 and
grants too much deference to employment decisions based on
those stereotypes. To end discrimination against persons with
disabilities, courts must place a higher burden on employers re-
quiring them to demonstrate that they did not make their deci-
sion based on flawed assumptions.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85 and accompanying text
(describing purpose of the McDonnell Douglas test).
124. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (describing the nature of
discrimination prohibited by the ADA).
125. See infra notes 163-164 and accompanying text (explaining why de-
fendants should receive limited deference in explaining their treatment of per-
sons with disabilities); see also infra note 147 and accompanying text
(explaining that the McDonnell Douglas test would allow an employer to avoid
its duty to reasonably accommodate).
126. Because of these stereotypes, it is difficult to accurately assess when a
disability truly prevents an individual from performing a job. "Unfortunately,
it is easy to draw unsupported conclusions concerning the ability of a handi-
capped individual to function safely in circumstances in which his impairment
is irrelevant." Wegner, supra note 42, at 441. Because a disability may affect a
person's ability to perform a job, an employer's reasons for not hiring a person
with a disability may seem legitimate and accurate. To combat this problem,
one commentator advocates using the civil rights model for disability discrimi-
nation. See Drimmer, supra note 1, at 1355-59. This model recognizes that the
barriers facing the disabled community do not result solely from physical limi-
tation, but from social standards created by an able-bodied society. Id.
1538
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
Furthermore, the different causes of discrimination against
persons with disabilities add to the insurmountable barrier for
disabled plaintiffs. Under McDonnell Douglas, even if a dis-
abled plaintiff can prove the defendant lied about its alleged rea-
sons for not hiring her, she is not in a significantly better
position to win her case.1 7 She still has to persuade a jury that
the employer intentionally discriminated against her.128 Be-
cause benign neglect and ignorance are often causes discrimina-
tion against persons with disabilities, a defendant's actions do
not readily appear intentional, hostile, or even prejudicial. In-
stead, their actions appear reasonable and normal because our
society often does not consider the needs of persons with disabil-
ities.129 Therefore, a disabled plaintiff might have difficulty con-
vincing a jury that intentional discrimination occurred.
B. COMPARISON OF BURDENS OF PROOF UNDER THE ADA AND
TrriLE VII IN LIGHT OF THEIR DIFFERENT PURPOSES
The ADA and Title VII are distinct statutes dealing with
substantially different types of discrimination. They differ pri-
marily in how they attempt to achieve equal employment oppor-
tunities. The ADA places on employers the affirmative duty to
reasonably accommodate disabled workers and applicants.1 30
This affirmative duty represents a conceptual shift from other
civil rights legislation.13 ' Thus, in essence, the ADA's duty to
127. See supra part I.C.1 (explaining the McDonnell Douglas analysis).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94 (explaining the plaintiff's ul-
timate burden of persuasion under McDonnell Douglas).
129. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing how society
has failed to take into account the needs of persons with disabilities).
130. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (describing employers'
duty under the ADA to reasonably accommodate disabled workers). The ADA's
unique, affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate employees can be substan-
tial. For example, it might require some employers to pay out significant
amounts of money to reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability.
See supra text accompanying notes 74-76 (noting that the cost of accommoda-
tion and an employer's ability to pay are factors courts consider in determining
whether reasonable accommodation creates an undue hardship). Under Title
VII, employers do have a duty to reasonably accommodate workers' needs based
on their religion. See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
This duty, however, is less substantial by comparison. Employers do not have
to accommodate for religious beliefs if it would entail more than a "de minimis
cost." Id. at 84. The drafters of the ADA specifically rejected this limited view
of the duty to reasonably accommodate. See H.R. Rap. No. 101-485(1), supra
note 17, at 31-32, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 350. Because of this impor-
tant difference, the duty to reasonably accommodate under the ADA is unique.
131. See Cooper, supra note 25, at 1427-31. Because society believes race,
religion, sex, and national origin are irrelevant to job performance, an employer
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reasonably accommodate mandates that employers treat per-
sons with disabilities differently than nondisabled persons.13 2
The ADA recognizes that because of the structural barriers im-
peding persons with disabilities, treating them in a manner sim-
ilar to nondisabled workers will not alleviate most of the
discrimination they encounter. 133 By contrast, Title VIE pros-
cribes differential treatment of employees for any reason.1 34 In
fact, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that Title VII
cannot in any way base an employment decision on these traits. See supra part
IIA (comparing disability discrimination to race and gender discrimination).
The ADA does not prevent employers from considering a disability com-
pletely. See id. (discussing complex interaction between a disability's effects on
an individual's ability to perform and the limitations on persons with disabili-
ties caused by prejudice). Instead, an employee must first be a "qualified indi-
vidual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). A qualified individual with a
disability is a person with a disability who, with or without reasonable accom-
modation, can perform the essential functions of the job. Id. Thus, an employer
may not consider a person's disability when the disability is irrelevant to per-
forming a job.
132. In the context of disability discrimination, equal treatment will not
yield equal opportunity. "The accommodation requirement [of the ADA] means
that in the context of disability, nondiscrimination requires employers to do
more than just treat employees equally; it requires employers to take positive
steps toward including workers with disabilities." Murphy, supra note 3, at
1608. The Supreme Court realized this fact in the context of the Rehabilitation
Act. "[To] assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the
grantee's program or benefit may have to be made." Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 301 (1985).
133. While treating disabled and nondisabled workers equally might elimi-
nate some discrimination against persons with disabilities, this approach fails
to challenge the structural and socially constructed barriers to persons with
disabilities. "Such identical treatment, however, would not foster the provision
of alternative ways of achieving given tasks or objectives so that handicapped
people could have meaningful opportunities to participate." SPECTRUM, supra
note 1, at 99. Such a view of equal opportunity does not involve treating per-
sons with disabilities more favorably than nondisabled individuals. Instead, it
recognizes social contexts are almost always structured for able-bodied people,
and, as a result, these ablest perspectives must be challenged to provide equal
opportunities for persons with disabilities.
134. Only in a few instances of race discrimination have the courts deter-
mined that equal treatment did not yield equal opportunity. See Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974). InLau, the plaintiffs challenged the practices of the
San Francisco school system under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id.
The school system provided 1800 Chinese, non-English speaking students in-
structions and materials only in English. Id. The Court found that "[u]nder
these state-imposed standards there is no equality of treatment merely by pro-
viding students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum;
for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any
meaningful education." Id.
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requires employers to treat workers differently or more favora-
bly because they are a member of a protected class. 13 5
Because the duty to reasonably accommodate represents a
significant difference between the ADA and Title VII, the Mc-
Donnell Douglas test is inappropriate for discrimination claims
brought under the ADA. Under the test, the employer has a lim-
ited burden of production. It simply has to produce evidence
that it chose not hire the plaintiff for a legitimate reason, unre-
lated to race or sex.136 This low burden is consistent with Title
VII's statutory requirement of equal treatment. The ADA con-
tains a more significant affirmative burden for the employer.1 37
As a result, the minor burden the McDonnell Douglas test places
on the defendant to rebut a presumption of discrimination goes
against the nature of the scheme the ADA has established. Be-
cause the ADA requires more of employers than does Title VII,
employers should have to meet a higher burden of proof to es-
cape an ADA discrimination claim.
C. CRITIQUE OF DECISIONS APPLYING THE MCDONNELL
DouGLAs TEST TO DIsABILITY DISCRIMINATION
With no mandate from the Supreme Court, circuit courts
have split on how to allocate the burden of proof under the Reha-
bilitation Act.138 Because of the similarities between the Reha-
bilitation Act and the ADA, courts should look to Rehabilitation
Act cases, not to Title VII cases, when interpreting the ADA.13 9
However, courts should also ignore Rehabilitation Act cases that
apply the McDonnell Douglas test because they fail to recognize
the need to treat persons with disabilities differently. For exam-
ple, in Doe v. New York University,x40 the court declared that if a
disability "provides a reasonable basis for finding the plaintiff
not to be qualified," an employer's decision not to hire the dis-
135. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977) (stat-
ing Title VII does not require differential or preferential treatment of people
because of their protected traits).
136. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing the McDon-
nell Douglas test).
137. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (describing an employer's
duty to reasonably accommodate employees).
138. See supra part 1.C (discussing different approaches courts have taken
in allocating the burden of proof under the Rehabilitation Act).
139. See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text (comparing probibi-
tions on discrimination under Title VII and the ADA); see also supra note 49
and accompanying text (explaining why courts should look to the Rehabilitation
Act for guidance in interpreting the ADA).
140. 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981).
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abled plaintiff is not discrimination. 141 The Doe court ignored
the fact that the very structures of society often discriminate
against persons with disabilities and, as a result, a disability
will often provide a "reasonable basis" for believing the plaintiff
cannot adequately perform the job.' 42 Moreover, in Prewitt v.
United States Postal Service,143 the court could have found that
the Postal Service acted reasonably by not hiring applicants
with motor skill limitations because they could not reach the top
shelf in the mail truck.'4 This overlooks that the Postal Service
could have lowered the mail truck's shelves to accommodate the
plaintiff.145
These types of cases also allow an employer to rebut a plain-
tiff's prima facie case merely by "going forward with evidence
that the handicap is relevant to qualifications for the position
sought."146 As a result, an employer can easily circumvent the
Rehabilitation Act's mandate to reasonably accommodate.147
141. Id. at 776. In Norcross v. Sneed, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit accepted the rationale of the Doe court. 755 F.2d 113, 116-17 (8th Cir.
1985). The court said Doe "contains the most convincing analysis of employ-
ment discrimination suits under section 504." Id. at 116. The court failed, how-
ever, to give any reason why this analysis is the most convincing.
142. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (explaining how society
has been structured without taking into consideration the needs of people with
disabilities).
143. 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
144. The Prewitt court, in contrast with the Doe court, applied a much
higher level of scrutiny to the defendant's hiring criteria. For the Postal Service
to defend its hiring criteria, which disqualified applicants with limited motor
skills, it had to prove that "the challenged criteria are job related, ie. that they
are required by business necessity." Id. at 306.
145. Id. at 305. The ADA, of course, requires employers to make reasonable
accommodations for qualified disabled employees. See supra notes 72-76 and
accompanying text (outlining the employer's duty to reasonably accommodate).
146. Doe, 666 F.2d at 776. The Doe court never mentioned the defendants
duty to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff or its duty to inquire whether it
would be able to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's disability. Id.
By 1981, when the Doe court had reached its decision, the Supreme Court
required employers to make reasonable accommodations for the needs of dis-
abled workers under the Rehabilitation Act. Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 (1979). In Davis, the Court examined whether any
reasonable accommodation could have allowed the plaintiff to participate in the
nursing school program. Id. at 412-13. The Court found that any accommoda-
tion would lower the standards of the program and, because of this, the school
did not discriminate against the plaintiff by refusing her admission. Id.
147. The affirmative burden to reasonably accommodate acknowledges that
a disability is relevant to job performance. Because of structural barriers, a
disabled employee may be unable to perform ajob without the employer making
some modifications. The ADA relieves an employer of the burden to reasonably
accommodate only when it can prove that the accommodation would be an un-
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For example, being able to answer the phone is a necessary qual-
ification for a receptionist position. A person with limited use of
her hands and arms may not be able to answer a standard tele-
phone, thus, her disability is relevant to the job qualifications.
Yet, modified equipment, such as a headset, could allow her to
perform the job. Furthermore, courts that fail to require that an
employer explore potential accommodations, as in Doe,1 48 also
allow employers to circumvent the Rehabilitation Act's clear
mandate.149
The cases applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis to Re-
habilitation Act claims have one final shortcoming: courts ap-
plying McDonnell Douglas fail to adequately address the
differences between disability discrimination and race and gen-
der discrimination. 150 In fact, some courts fail to mention this
distinction altogether. 151 In Doe, the court admitted that the al-
location of the burden of proof for employment discrimination
claims "does not lend itself easily" to disability discrimination
claims in which the employer admits to relying on the disability
in making its employment decision.152 In the end, however, the
court adopted a modified test, but retained the same allocation
of the burden of proof.' 53
III. ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN ADA
CLAIMS: RECOGNIZING THE UNIQUE CONTEXT OF
DISABILITY DISCREVIINATION
Two general types of employment discrimination in ADA
claims require an employer to consider making reasonable ac-
commodations for persons with disabilities. First, a plaintiff
might claim that she possessed the necessary qualifications for a
job but that the employer rejected her because of her disability.
The employer would then respond that it rejected the plaintiff
because she could not perform the job, with or without reason-
due hardship. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76 (explaining duty of em-
ployers to reasonably accommodate).
148. Doe, 666 F.2d 761.
149. See supra notes 54-56, 72-76 and accompanying text (outlining require-
ments of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA to reasonably accommodate dis-
abled workers).
150. See supra part H-A-3 (demonstrating why this analysis is vital to any
discussion of an appropriate allocation of the burden of proof in disability dis-
crimination cases).
151. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1987); Norcross v.
Sneed, 755 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985).
152. 666 F.2d at 776.
153. Id.
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able accommodations. In the second type of claim, the plaintiff
would claim she is qualified for the job, but the employer did not
hire her because it did not want to reasonably accommodate her
disability. The defendant would respond by claiming that to
reasonably accommodate this plaintiff would be an undue
hardship.
Courts should not apply the McDonnell Douglas test to
either of these ADA claims. The test is useless in such claims
because it does not further its own purpose, namely, "to sharpen
the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional dis-
crimination."154 The defendant has already admitted that it
based its decision on the plaintiff's disability. Because of that
disability, the defendant concluded either that the plaintiff was
not qualified, or that it would be too great an inconvenience to
accommodate that disability.
Instead, the allocations of burden of proof proposed below
comport with the text of the ADA-55 and its legislative history 56
better than the McDonnell Douglas test. If an employer admits
that it based its employment decision on the plaintiff's disabil-
ity, courts should require that the plaintiff first establish a
prima facie case by demonstrating that she is a qualified indi-
vidual who can perform the essential functions of the job with or
without reasonable accommodation. The employer then could
defend itself in one of two ways. It could refute the plaintiff's
prima facie case by proving that the plaintiff is not qualified for
the position because he cannot perform the essential functions of
154. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8
(1981).
155. The ADA specifically prohibits employers from
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disabil-
ity who is an applicant or an employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business of such covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A).
156. The legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress intended the
ADA to be interpreted in the same manner that courts have interpreted the
Rehabilitation Act. "The Committee intends that the burdens of proof under
each of the aforementioned sections [all of which refer to employment discrimi-
nation] be construed in the same manner in which parallel agency provisions
are constructed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as of June 4, 1989."
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(H1), supra note 17, at 31-32, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 354. Some courts interpreting the Rehabilitation Act have fol-
lowed this analysis. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (citing these
cases).
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the job with or without reasonable accommodation. 157 Refusing
to hire the plaintiff under such circumstances does not fall under
the definition of discrimination under the ADA.158 In the alter-
native, the employer could raise the affirmative defense that
making a reasonable accommodation would create an undue
hardship.
In response to the second type of claim, a claim of failure to
reasonably accommodate, employers may also raise undue hard-
ship as an affirmative defense. 159 As with most affirmative de-
fenses, the defendant, as the party raising it, should have the
burden of proving it.16° The defendant is the party with the
knowledge, experience, and resources to determine whether it
can make reasonable accommodations for the plaintiff.16 ' Fur-
thermore, courts should allocate the burden of proof in this man-
ner because it furthers the goals of the ADA. The ADA seeks to
provide equal employment opportunities for persons with disa-
bilities, and refusing to reasonably accommodate an individual
157. The defendant should have the burden of persuasion on this issue be-
cause of the complex interaction between a disability and a disabled person's
ability to work. By placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant, courts
will ensure that employers are truly looking at a disabled individual's abilities
to determine whether she is qualified for a job, and not imputing too many limi-
tations on her abilities because of her disability. "The goal of inclusion de-
mands that employers carefully consider the extent to which they are
measuring actual ability to perform a job as well as the alternative ways in
which a traditional task could be performed." See Murphy, supra note 3, at
1642.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the definition of discrimination under the ADA).
159. The federal regulations interpreting the ADA, as well as the ADA itself,
imply that an undue hardship claim is an affirmative defense. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (stating that an employer must demonstrate undue hardship
to avoid liability for employment discrimination for failure to reasonably accom-
modate); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (1994) (same).
160. See CHARLEs A. W iGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 5122 (1977 & Supp. 1994). Wright contends that courts usually consider
three factors in determining who has the burden of proof for a certain issue:
policy, probability, and possession of proof. Id. at 556. For an undue hardship
claim, each of these elements points toward the defendant having the burden of
proof.
161. As one circuit court noted:
The employer has greater knowledge of the essentials of the job than
does the handicapped applicant. The employer can look to its own ex-
perience, or if that is not helpful, to that of other employers who have
provided jobs to individuals with handicaps similar to those of the ap-
plicant in question. Furthermore, the employer may be able to obtain
advice concerning possible accommodations from private and govern-
ment sources.
Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 (5th Cir. 1981).
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with a disability thwarts this goal.162 By placing the burden of
persuasion on the employer to prove an undue hardship, 163
courts will ensure employers take the procedural duties of the
ADA seriously. Employers will not be able to rebut the plain-
tiff's case with the stereotypes and generalities that Congress
designed the ADA to prevent.164
CONCLUSION
Persons with disabilities encounter tremendous employ-
ment discrimination in our society. Structural barriers and in-
accurate stereotypes about the limitations of persons with
disabilities cause this pervasive discrimination. Congress
designed the ADA to prevent disability discrimination by all em-
ployers. For the ADA to achieve its intended effect, courts must
allocate the burden of proof for a cause of action under the Act
differently than they have with other types of employment dis-
crimination claims.
In particular, courts should not apply the McDonnell Doug-
las allocation of the burden of proof to ADA claims. Because of
the unique relationship between a disability and an individual's
ability to perform a job, and the unique affirmative burden on
employers to reasonably accommodate workers with disabilities,
courts should place higher burdens on employers who wish to
escape liability in disability discrimination cases. Depending on
the facts of a particular case, employers should have the burden
to prove either that the plaintiff is not qualified for the job, or
that reasonably accommodating the plaintiff would cause an un-
due hardship on the defendant. Without such an allocation of
the burden of proof, persons with disabilities will continue to
face employment discrimination which will prevent them from
reaching their full potential as working Americans.
162. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text (discussing the neces-
sity of reasonable accommodation to achieve the goals of the ADA).
163. See Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Analyzing Em-
ployment Discrimination Claims, 132 U. PA. L. Rxv. 867, 895-96 (1984). The
author argues that if the defendant only has a limited burden of proof, courts
will "grant[ ] excessive deference to the employment decisions of federally
funded program administrators." Id. at 896.
164. See id. at 896. The author argues that placing a lesser burden on em-
ployers when they have failed to accommodate a worker with a disability
reduces the law "to an admonition to employers that they should be able to
come up with plausible justifications for their judgment that it would be diffi-
cult for a handicapped person to perform a particular job." Id.
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